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EDUCATION: BALANCING THE INTERESTS OF SCHOOLS,
STUDENTS, AND THE COMMUNITY
INTRODUCTION
In 1996-97,' the Tenth Circuit refined its application of controver-
sial federal statutes and case law in education-related cases. First, the
court carved out a new interpretation of the Individuals with Disabilities
Education Act (IDEA) to require public school districts to provide spe-
cial education services to students voluntarily enrolled in private
schools.2 Subsequently, IDEA amendments3 trumped the decision and the
U.S. Supreme Court remanded the case in light of those amendments.'
Second, the court continued to clarify the Pickering' and Connick6 tests to
define "matters of public concern" in public employee free speech
claims." Third, the court integrated a new federal statute which changes
the administrative standard for determining a child's eligibility for social
security disability payments, effectively reducing the number of children
receiving benefits." Finally, the court dismissed an action challenging the
constitutionality of the Colorado Constitution's busing clause and the
state charter schools and school choice statutes because the case did not
present a justiciable case or controversy."0
This survey analyzes the implications of each of the education-
related cases decided over the past year. Part I examines the impact of
the court's ruling in Fowler v. Unified School District No. 259" on the
ability of public schools to deliver special education services in compli-
ance with the IDEA. Part II discusses the continuing struggle to balance
the First Amendment rights of public employees against the censorship
needs of schools and other public agencies. Part III assesses the conse-
1. The survey period covers cases decided between September 1996 and August 1997.
2. Fowler v. Unified Sch. Dist. No. 259, 107 F.3d 797, 806-09 (10th Cir.), vacated, 117 S.
Ct. 2503 (1997).
3. See infra note 85 and accompanying text.
4. Fowler v. Unified Sch. Dist. No. 259, 117 S. Ct. 2503 (1997).
5. Pickering v. Board of Educ., 391 U.S. 563 (1968).
6. Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138 (1983).
7. See Gardetto v. Mason, 100 F.3d 803, 812-16 (10th Cir. 1996); Bunger v. University of
Okla. Bd. of Regents, 95 F.3d 987, 991-92 (10th Cir. 1996).
8. Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act of 1996, Pub. L. No.
104-193, 110 Stat. 2105 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 42 U.S.C.).
9. See Brown v. Callahan, 120 F.3d 1133, 1135-36 (10th Cir. 1997). Social Security
Disability indirectly affects schools because evaluation of the child's disability and therapies often
surrounds the child's cognitive and emotional functioning in the classroom.
10. Keyes v. School Dist. No. I, 119 F.3d 1437, 1445 (10th Cir. 1997).
11. 107 F.3d 797 (10th Cir.), vacated, 117 S. Ct. 2503 (1997).
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quences of the Welfare Reform Act 2 on children seeking SSI disability
payments under more stringent evaluation standards. Part IV discusses
the court's dismissal of a desegregation action for want of standing and
ripeness 3 in light of the enduring battle over court supervised desegrega-
tion efforts.
I. SPECIAL EDUCATION FOR PRIVATE SCHOOL STUDENTS
A. Background: Individuals with Disabilities Education Act (IDEA)"
States and locally elected school boards bear the major responsibil-
ity for determining educational policy as well as maintenance and opera-
tion of the public schools." State constitutional provisions grant legisla-
tures authority to provide a general and uniform system of free public
schools open to all.'6 The federal government provides financial assis-
tance to state and local educational agencies to meet the special needs of
educationally deprived children."
In 1990, Congress passed the Individuals with Disabilities Educa-
tion Act (IDEA)," which replaced the 1975 Education of the Handi-
capped Act. 9 The primary goal of the IDEA is to "assure that all children
with disabilities have available to them. . a free appropriate public edu-
cation which emphasizes special education and related services designed
to meet their unique needs."' The Act provides federal grants to assist
school districts furnishing special education services.2' Each eligible stu-
dent must have an Individual Education Plan (IEP) to assess the student's
present levels of educational performance and to identify annual goals
and the specific services the student requires.' Litigation and judicial
interpretation of the IDEA shape the meaning of "free and appropriate"
12. Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act of 1996, 110 Stat.
2105. The titles Welfare Reform Act and Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity
Reconciliation Act are used synonymously in this article.
13. Keyes, 119 F.3d at 1443-46.
14. 20 U.S.C. § 1400 (1994).
15. See Board of Educ, v. Pico, 457 U.S. 853, 893 (1982) (Powell, J., dissenting).
16. See, e.g., In re Kindergarten Sch., 32 P. 422, 423 (Colo. 1893) (holding that the state
legislature has the authority to establish a kindergarten department in the public school system).
17. 20 U.S.C. § 6301(a) (1994).
18. Individuals with Disabilities Education Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-476, § 901, 104 Stat.
1103, 1141, 20 U.S.C. § 1400 (1990); see also Tobin P. Richer, San Diego v. California Special
Educ. Hearing Office: A Misapplication and Drastic Expansion of IDEA Coverage, 26 J.L. & EDUC.
1, 2 (1997) (discussing background and impact of the IDEA).
19. Individuals with Disabilities Education Act § 901(a)(2).
20. 20 U.S.C. § 1400(c) (1990).
21. Id. § 1412(1); see also James D. Oegema, Individuals with Disabilities Education Act:
Ensuring an Education for Individuals or Ensuring an Education for Individuals Who Attend Public
Schools? 2 MICH. L. & POL'Y REV. 97, 99 (1997) (providing background on the IDEA, its
corresponding regulations, and cases interpreting the Act).
22. William D. Goren, Individuals with Disabilities Education Act: The Interrelationship to
the ADA and Preventive Law, 71 FLA. B.J. 76, 76 (1997).
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and "related services," and determine situations in which a public school
district must reimburse parents for special education costs.' School dis-
tricts, motivated by concerns of economic efficiency amidst shrinking
budgets, have argued for a limited scope of IDEA coverage.'
In Board of Education v. Rowley,' the U.S. Supreme Court defined
the terms "free and appropriate" education and "related services.... "Free
and appropriate" education is provided at public expense, meets state
educational standards, includes an appropriate preschool, elementary or
secondary school education, and is consistent with the student's IEP.'
"Related services" are those that help a student benefit from special edu-
cation.' The school district satisfies the "free and appropriate" provision
if, at the time the IEP was created, it was "reasonably calculated to en-
able the child to receive some educational benefit."'
Attending a private school does not waive or invalidate a disabled
student's right to free and appropriate education at public expense. ° Be-
cause the local public school might not meet the needs of all students,
private school placement may be necessary.' While local education
agencies (LEAs)" place some students in private schools, parents also
voluntarily place their children in private school without the approval of
an LEA."
Although school districts must provide special services to students
placed in private schools by LEAs,"' a district's obligation to provide
special services to disabled students voluntarily placed in private schools
23. See Richer, supra note 18, at 2.
24. See id.
25. 458 U.S. 176 (1982).
26. Rowley, 458 U.S. at 188.
27. Id.
28. Id. Some examples of related services include transportation, speech pathology, physical
therapy, and counseling. Id. n.10.
29. Id. at 206-07; see Richer, supra note 18, at 4 (discussing the Rowley Court's definition of
"free and appropriate education"). Some states, however, transcend the "reasonably calculated"
threshold and require public school districts to develop special education programs to maximize each
disabled student's potential. Goren, supra note 22, at 77.
30. See State Educational Agency Responsibility, 34 C.F.R. § 300.451 (1997).
31. Cf. Kathryn Browning Hendrickson, The IDEA: Conferring Rights on Disabled Children
in Unilateral Private School Placements, 4 KY. CHILDREN'S RTS. J. 1, 2 (1996) (concluding that the
IDEA "unquestionably allows private placement by a public agency at public expense ... where
there is no appropriate public placement available").
32. "Local Education Agencies" refer to public school districts and other public education
administrators. See Local Educational Agency, 34 C.F.R. § 300.11 (1997).
33. See Cefalu v. East Baton Rouge Parish Sch. Bd., 103 F.3d 393, 396 (5th Cir. 1997), rev'd,
117 F.3d 231 (5th Cir. 1997).
34. See Local Educational Agency Responsibility, 34 C.F.R. § 300.452 (1997).
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remains unclear.3 The IDEA vaguely governs special education services
to private school students,36 and provides:
[T]o the extent consistent with the number and location of children
with disabilities in the State who are enrolled in private elementary
and secondary schools, provision is made for participation of such
children in the program... [and] that children with disabilities in pri-
vate schools.., be provided special education and related services..
at no cost to their parents or guardian.37
The phrases "consistent with the number and location of children with
disabilities" and "participation of such children" are ambiguous?8 In ad-
dition, the statute does not determine which services satisfy the partici-
pation requirement or whether a district must provide those services on
site at the private school.39 Department of Education (DOE) regulations
require that school districts afford private school students a "genuine
opportunity for equitable participation" in special education services.'
Such amorphous language leads to divergent circuit court interpretations
of public school district obligations to private school students.4'
The circuit courts that have addressed public school obligations to
furnish special education services to students voluntarily placed in pri-
vate schools have produced mixed opinions and results." Relevant circuit
court opinions generally fall into two categories: the discretionary inter-
pretation and the limited discretionary interpretation. 3 The Fourth and
Seventh Circuits have adopted the discretionary approach." In Goodall v.
Stafford County School Board," the parents enrolled their hearing-
impaired son in a parochial school in order to further his religious educa-
tion.' The public school district refused to provide an on site cued-
speech interpreter because the interpreter was available at the jublic
school.'7 Similarly, in K.R. v. Anderson Community School Corp.," the
35. See Oegema, supra note 21, at 98.
36. See id. at 100-01 (noting that vague statutory language had engendered different
interpretations in the circuit courts).
37. 20 U.S.C. § 1413(a)(4) (1994).
38. See Oegema, supra note 2 1, at 101.
39. See id. at 101-02.
40. Responsibility of a State and a State Subgrantee, 34 C.F.R. § 76.651 (a)(1) (1997).
41. See, e.g., Oegema, supra note 21, at 101-03 (blaming the ambiguity of the Act for the
conflicting circuit court interpretations). Compare K.R. v. Anderson Community Sch. Corp., 81 F.3d
673 (7th Cir. 1996) (finding that students attending private school are not entitled to special
education services at their own school), with Russman v. Sobol, 85 F.3d 1050 (2d Cir. 1996)
(concluding private school student entitled to on-site special education services).
42. See Oegema, supra note 21, at 101-03.
43. See id. at 104.
44. See K.R. v. Anderson Community Sch. Corp., 81 F.3d 673, 678-80 (7th Cir. 1996);
Goodall v. Stafford County Sch. Bd., 930 F.2d 363,367-68 (4th Cir. 1991).
45. 930 F.2d 363 (4th Cir. 1991).
46. Goodall, 930 F.2d at 364.
47. Id. at 365.
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district refused to provide an aide at a private school site for a child suf-
fering from multiple disabilities and requiring a full-time instructional
assistant.'9 Both circuits concluded that the school district had discretion
in providing special education to students voluntarily placed in private
schools. ' The courts held that the public school district discharges its
obligations if the disabled private school student has a genuine opportu-
nity to participate in the necessary services available at a public institu-
tion."' The courts did not require the district to provide the services on the
private school site itself"
In contrast, the Second and Fifth Circuits have circumscribed school
district discretion to provide special education services to students vol-
untarily placed in private schools." These circuits required that some
level of services be provided to those students at the private school set-
ting.' The Second Circuit held that if comparable services at the public
school are inadequate, the school district must provide the services at the
private school as long as the costs do not exceed the cost of the services
at the public school." In Cefalu v. East Baton Rouge Parish School
Board,' the Fifth Circuit reached a similar conclusion, 7 holding that vol-
untarily placed private school students must be active participants in the
special education programs designed by educational agencies that suffer
from limited funding. 8 In addition, the court determined that private
school students were not entitled to any greater share of special educa-
tion funds than were similarly situated public school students. 9 There-
fore, the public school district must provide on-site special education
services to private school students at the same approximate cost as the
district would incur in providing those services at public sites.' IDEA
Amendments passed on June 4, 1996,6 have since superseded Cefalu.62
48. 81 F.3d 673 (7th Cir. 1996).
49. Anderson, 81 F.3d at 675.
50. Id. at 679; Goodall, 930 F.2d at 367-68.
51. Anderson, 81 F.3d at 680; Goodall, 930 F.2d at 368.
52. Anderson, 81 F.3d at 680; Goodall, 930 F.2d at 367-69.
53. See Cefalu v. East Baton Rouge Parish Sch. Bd., 103 F.3d 393 (5th Cir. 1997); Russman v.
Sobol, 85 F.3d 1050 (2d Cir. 1996).
54. See Oegema, supra note 21, at 104 (discussing how the implications of economic realities
may "dictate that services be provided at one location," the public school).
55. Russman, 85 F.3d at 1056-57.
56. 103 F.3d 393 (5th Cir. 1997). Although Cefalu falls within the survey period, it is treated
here as background because the Tenth Circuit relied on it in making its decision.
57. Cefalu, 103 F.3d at 398.
58. Id. at 397.
59. Id. at 398.
60. Id.
61. Individuals with Disabilities Education Act Amendments of 1997, Pub. L No. 105-17, §
612(a)(10)(C), Ill Stat. 37, 63 (stating specifically that public school districts are not required to
pay for the cost of special education services for a voluntarily placed private school student at a
private school site if free appropriate education is available at the public school site). These
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B. Fowler v. Unified School District. No. 25963
1. Facts
Fowler, an elementary school student, suffered from severe hearing
impairments and required interpretive services.' The public school pro-
vided a full-time interpreter who assisted Fowler pursuant to his IEP.'
However, because Fowler was "gifted" with "superior intellectual ca-
pacity," his parents enrolled him in a nearby private school, which they
thought would better suit his intellectual needs. 7 Despite the parents'
request, the school district refused to pay for the interpretive services at
the private school site because they were available at the public school."
The trial court ruled in favor of the parents, and the school district ap-
pealed.'
2. Decision
The Tenth Circuit, relying on Cefalu and Russman, held that public
school districts must provide disabled students who are voluntarily en-
rolled in private schools with special education services at the private
school, but limited the district's financial obligation to the average cost
of such services provided at a public school.70 Relying on IDEA regula-
tions, the court determined that although the school district must provide
special education services to the students voluntarily placed in private
schools,"1 the regulations allow some limited discretion regarding the
manner and extent of delivering those services."2
The court reasoned that voluntarily placed private school students
should not necessarily receive the identical level of special education
amendments and their effect on Fowler and similar cases in other circuits are discussed infra text
accompanying notes 85-97.
62. Cefalu v. East Baton Rouge Parish Sch. Bd., 117 F.3d 231 (5th Cir. 1997).
63. 107 F.3d 797 (10th Cir.), vacated, 117 S. Ct. 2503 (1997).
64. Fowler, 107 F.3d at 800.
65. Id.
66. Id. Fowler was eventually designated as "gifted." Id.
67. Id.
68. Id.
69. Id. at 800-01.
70. Id. at 807-08.
71. Id. at 806 (citing Responsibility of a State and a State Subgrantee, 34 C.F.R. § 76.651
(1997)). Section 76.651 requires school districts to "provide students enrolled in private schools with
a genuine opportunity for equitable participation ...." 34 C.F.R. § 76.651. This amorphous
language suggests that providing services is required, but some discretion is afforded the districts in
managing those services.
72. Fowler, 107 F.3d at 806 (citing Cefalu v. East Baton Rouge Parish Sch. Dist., 103 F.3d
393, 396 (5th Cir. 1997)). For an interpretation of state educational agency responsibility, see 34
C.F.R. § 300.451 (1997). Section 300.451 requires that school districts must provide "[t]o the extent
consistent with their number and location in the state ... for the participation of private school
children with disabilities ... by providing them with special education and related services . I.." d.
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services available to public school students, but a "genuine opportunity
for equitable participation" required services comparable in quality,
scope, and opportunity to those provided to public school students."
Thus, although the district must pay for the services at the private school,
the amount should not exceed the average cost the district would incur to
provide the same service to similarly situated students at the public
schools."
C. Analysis
The Fowler ruling appears to be a compromise between the finan-
cial needs of parents and those of school districts. This limited discretion
interpretation of the IDEA is plausible since the language of the statute
indicates congressional intent to grant a special education entitlement to
all disabled students, whether public or private school enrollees." How-
ever, problematic policy implications riddle the limited discretion ap-
proach. First, by limiting a school district's discretion in furnishing spe-
cial education services, the ruling increases parental discretion to remove
children from public schools for virtually any reason. Fowler does not
require parents to place their children in private schools for special edu-
cation purposes. The Fowlers did not contend that the public school pro-
vided inadequate interpreter services for their son's hearing impairment."6
They removed him because they felt the public school did not meet his
superior intellectual needs," a reason unrelated to his hearing impair-
ment. Parents place students in private schools for a variety of reasons.
Some enroll their children in parochial schools because they seek a re-
ligious curriculum. Others might enroll their children in private schools
with superior athletic programs in order to increase exposure to college
scouts, or for some other reason independent of any special cognitive,
physical, or socio-emotional disability of the child. The court should
have limited the discretion of parents by requiring them to tie the private
school placement to the child's disability while also restricting the dis-
cretion of the public school districts.
Second, the Fowler ruling promotes inefficient allocation of scarce
special education resources. Special education is extremely expensive,
siphon precious funds from their general accounts .9 The court tried to
mitigate high expenses by limiting private school costs to the average
73. Fowler, 107 F.3d at 805.
74. Id. at 807-08.
75. Oegema, supra note 21, at 119.
76. Fowler, 107 F.3d at 800.
77. Id.
78. However, the reason was tied to his status as a gifted and talented student. Id. Gifted and
talented is often considered a special education designation. Therefore, the Fowlers arguably
removed Michael from the public school for special education purposes, but not for reasons tied to
his hearing impairment.
79. Thomas Frank, House Bill Increases Funds for Special-Needs Students, DENVER POST,
Feb. 11, 1997, at B6.
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cost of similar services for similarly situated public schools students. '
This approach, however, is shortsighted. Determining the average cost of
one student's special services is an onerous task because an IEP is indi-
vidualized. Each student requires different services. Furthermore, differ-
ent students require varying levels of services. Therefore, adequately
defining "similarly situated students" is an illusory benchmark, and
finding similarly situated students in order to compare costs is unman-
ageable.
Moreover, the costs of needed services may be greater at a private
school than at a public school. Public school special education depart-
ments are designed to meet the various and diverse needs of their many
students. Students often have multiple disabilities. For example, one spe-
cial needs student suffered from retarded motor skill development, and
his IEP required a full time note-taking assistant." Yet, he also suffered
from Tourettes syndrome82 and severe emotional difficulty. Similarly, in
Anderson,"3 the student's disabilities created mobility, motor skill, and
expressive language difficulties and required use of a wheelchair." Both
students need a variety of special services. A public school, with a sub-
stantial staff of specialized instructors, can meet the many needs of these
students while simultaneously providing services to other students. How-
ever, if either student attends a private school, and the school lacks a
substantial special education department, a mini-staff must be built
around that student, increasing the costs of providing services to that
student and leading to an inefficient use of public resources. Under
Fowler, money needed for public school programs will subsidize extra
costs associated with providing special services at private schools,
thereby diluting other public school services.
The IDEA Amendments Act of 19975 put the debate to rest. The
amendments specifically state:
this part does not require a local educational agency to pay for the
cost of education, including special education and related services ...
at a private school or facility if that agency made a free appropriate
education available to the child and the parents elected to place the
child in such private school."
80. See Fowler, 107 F.3d at 807-08.
81. The author has been a public school teacher and the student was one of his students.
82. Tourettes syndrome is "a rare disease characterized by involuntary tics and by
uncontrollable verbalizations .... MERRIAM WEBSTER'S MEDICAL DESK DICTIONARY 821 (1996).
83. 81 F.3d 673 (7th Cir. 1996).
84. Anderson, 81 F.3d at 676.
85. Individuals with Disabilities Education Act Amendments of 1997, Pub. L. No. 105-17, §
612(a)(10)(c), Ill Stat. 37, 63 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 20 U.S.C.).
86. Individuals with Disabilities Education Act Amendments § 612 (a)(10)(C), Il1 Stat. at 63.
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The amendments attempt to clarify the legislative intent of the IDEA."7
After the passage of the amendments, the Fifth Circuit reversed its Ce-
falu opinion." The U.S. Supreme Court remanded Russman for reconsid-
eration in light of the amendments. 9 In addition, the DOE's interpretation
does not require that districts pay for services for students voluntarily
placed in private schools, but rather, that free and appropriate education
is available to all disabled students, and a proportionate share of federal
funds are earmarked for students voluntarily placed in private schools.'
On appeal, the U.S. Supreme Court also remanded Fowler for re-
consideration in light of the IDEA amendments.9 The Tenth Circuit ruled
that while the amendments clarified that the IDEA does not compel pub-
lic school districts to provide on-site services at the private school, the
amendments were not retroactive' and took effect after June 4, 1997.93
Because the court decided Fowler prior to June 4, 1997, the amendments
did not apply to that case.' The court emphasized that a "clarifying"
amendment did not necessarily restate the intent of the original enacting
Congress, particularly for a law that was enacted twenty-two years ear-
lier." Thus, the court applied the amendments only to cases occurring
after June 4, 1997'
It is axiomatic that all children should have access to needed special
education services as "it is doubtful that any child may reasonably be
expected to succeed in life if he is denied the opportunity of an education
... on equal terms." Of course, no special needs student should be de-
nied equal access to special education. However, retaining school district
discretion to determine the most appropriate and cost effective way to
administer those services does not deny any student access to special
education.
II. FREE SPEECH OF PUBLIC EMPLOYEES
Public employment is an enigma because civic agencies are both
"employers" and "public." The First Amendment generally restricts gov-
ernment action that restrains speech.9 While acting as a business, a gov-
ernment agency is charged with maintaining an efficient workplace, and
87. Cefalu v. East Baton Rouge Parish Sch. Bd., 117 F.3d 231, 232 (5th Cir. 1997).
88. Cefalu, 117 F.3d at 233.
89. Board of Educ. v. Russman, 117 S. Ct. 2502 (1997). The case has yet to be reheard by the
trial court.
90. Cefalu, 117 F.3d at 232.
91. Fowler v. Unified Sch. Dist. No. 259, 117 S. Ct. 2503 (1997).
92. Fowler v. Unified Sch. Dist. No. 259, 128 F.3d 1431, 1436 (10th Cir. 1997).
94. Fowler, 128 F.3d at 1434-35.
94. Id.
95. Id. at 1436.
96. Id.
97. Hendrickson, supra note 31, at I (quoting Brown v. Board of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 493
(1954)).
98. U.S. CONST. amend. I.
1998]
DENVER UNIVERSIThY LAW REVIEW
therefore has an interest in censoring speech that could be counterpro-
ductive to its operations.' However, the agency is also an arm of gov-
ernment, and therefore, a potential tyrant whose power must be curbed to
protect free speech.'"m The resulting split personality of the public em-
ployer affords its employees greater free speech protections than an at-
will private employee would enjoy. °' An at-will employee can be termi-
nated with or without cause, and therefore does not enjoy free speech
rights in the workplace. Conversely, government employees enjoy fur-
ther protections because their employer is the state.
At the same time, the public employee compromises some free
speech rights in order to contribute to the productive operation of the
agency" and not disrupt the functioning of the enterprise."' Thus, free
speech in the public workplace is not absolute. Instead, courts balance
the interests of the public employer in controlling disruption against the
employee's interest in free speech and the dangers of censorship at the
hands of the sovereign."'
Two Tenth Circuit decisions reflect the uncertainty which riddles
public employee speech cases where courts apply the Pickering/Connick
balancing test.'"m Although the language of the test is simple, its applica-
tion is maddeningly inconsistent. In both cases, public schools demoted
or terminated teachers who criticized school policies."'" However, the
court reached different conclusions in each case. In the first case,
Gardetto v. Mason,"m the court found, as a matter of law, that the
teacher's speech was protected by the First Amendment.'" One month
earlier, however, in Bunger v. University of Oklahoma Board of
Regents,"' the court denied claims that two public university professors
were terminated due to their speech because the specific speech was not
protected by the First Amendment."'
99. Karin B. Hoppmann, Note, Concern with Public Concern: Toward a Better Definition of
the Pickering/Connick Threshold Test, 50 VAND. L. REV. 993, 994 (1997).
100. Id.
101. Id.
102. Id. at 994-95.
103. See Bernadette Marczely, Free Speech or Public Agency Efficiency?, 51 DISP. RESOL. J.
18, 19 (1996); see, e.g., Branti v. Finkel, 445 U.S. 507, 518 (1980) (noting that a state governor may
require high-ranking deputies to share the governor's political beliefs); Broadrick v. Oklahoma, 413
U.S. 601, 616-18 (1973) (holding that government employees may be prohibited from participating
in political campaigns).
104. Hoppmann, supra note 99, at 995-96.
105. See Gardetto v. Mason, 100 F.3d 803 (10th Cir. 1996); Bunger v. University of Okla. Bd.
of Regents, 95 F.3d 987 (10th Cir. 1996).
106. Gardetto, 100 F.3d at 808-10; Bunger, 95 F.3d at 989-90.
107. 100 F.3d 803 (10th Cir. 1996).
108. Gardetto, 100 F.3d at 816.
109. 95 F.3d 987 (10th Cir. 1996).




The seminal cases providing the backdrop of public employee free
speech claims are Pickering v. Board of Education"' and Connick v.
Myers."2 The cornerstone of the analysis is determining whether the
content of the speech reflects "matters of public concern.'"' 3 If the speech
does not reflect matters of public concern it is not protected speech."'
However, if the speech does reflect matters of public concern, the court
balances the speech interests against the government's censorship inter-
ests."5 The First Amendment protects the "profound national commit-
ment to the principle that debate on public issues should be uninhibited,
robust and wide open."'' 6 "Matters of public concern" are political, so-
cial, or other concerns. 7 that contribute to the debate on public issues.
Internal personnel matters are not "matters of public concern" because
they do not address policy issues."8 "[T]he First Amendment does not
require a public office to be run as a roundtable for public employee
complaints" over the internal operations of public agencies."9
Pickering, a public school teacher, was terminated after writing a
newspaper editorial criticizing the school board's bond proposals and
spending decisions." The board argued that publication of the editorial
disrupted "the efficient operation and administration of the schools.'.'
The U.S. Supreme Court balanced the teacher's interest in "commenting
upon matters of public concern," and the state's interest "in promoting
the efficiency of public services."'" The Court found that comment on
bond proposals and spending decisions are matters of public concern,"
and teachers are informed members of the community who positively
contribute to public debate on school finance.' The Court ruled in favor
of Pickering because the school's interest in limiting efficiency did not
outweigh the teacher's interest in contributing to public debate and the
public's interest in unhindered discourse on matters of public impor-
tance.
111. 391 U.S. 563 (1968).
112. 461 U.S. 138 (1983).
113. Connick, 461 U.S. at 147.
114. Id.
115. Pickering, 391 U.S. at 568.
116. New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 270 (1964).
117. Connick, 461 U.S. at 146.
118. See id. at 147.
119. Weisbuch v. County of Los Angeles, 119 F.3d 778, 782 (9th Cir. 1997) (citing Connick,
461 U.S. at 147-49).
120. Pickering, 391 U.S. at 564.
121. Id.
122. Id. at 568.
123. Id. at 571-72.
124. Id.
125. Id. at 573-74.
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In Connick, Assistant District Attorney Myers circulated an office
questionnaire soliciting views regarding certain office policies, the em-
ployee's level of confidence in their supervisors, and whether employees
felt pressured to work on political campaigns." Connick terminated
Myers in part for distributing the questionnaire." The Court's "public
concern" analysis focused on the content, form and context of the ques-
tionnaire." The Court found that only the question addressing whether
employees felt compelled to work on political campaigns addressed a
matter of public concern.' The other questions either addressed the in-
ternal operations of the district attorney's office or were not of public
import in evaluating the office.'" Since one question did touch a matter
of public concern, the Court invoked the Pickering balancing test. "' The
Court found that Myers's interest in free speech did not outweigh the
government's interest in corralling office disruption, and upheld the ter-
mination.'32
B. Tenth Circuit Cases
1. Gardetto v. Mason"3
a. Facts
Gardetto, Director of Special Student Services at Eastern Wyoming
College, ' alleged that the school demoted and suspended her in retalia-
tion for her use of constitutionally protected speech.'33 Six instances of
speech formed the basis of Gardetto's claim."' She criticized the col-
lege's reduction-in-force procedures at a board of trustees meeting.' 7 She
opposed the procedures the college used in terminating a fellow em-
ployee.'38 She supported a no confidence vote in Mason, the college
president. "9 She criticized Mason's holding himself out as a "doctor"
without a doctoral degree.'" She supported three non-incumbent candi-
dates for the college's board of trustees.'' Finally, she criticized the reor-
126. Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138, 141 (1983).
127. Id.
128. Id. at 147-48.
129. Id. at 149.
130. Id. at 148.
131. Id. at 149-50.
132. Id. at 154.
133. 100 F.3d 803 (10th Cir. 1996).










ganization of the Adult Reentry Center to a visitor giving a speech at the
college."2 The jury returned a special verdict in favor of Mason because
the jury did not believe Gardetto's speech was the motivating factor be-
hind the termination.13
b. Decision
On appeal, the Tenth Circuit fashioned a four-step test based on
Pickering and Connick." First, the court determines, as a matter of law,
whether the employee's speech constitutes a matter of public concern."-
Second, if it is a matter of public concern, the Pickering balancing test
balances the State's interest in efficiency against the employee's speech
interests." Third, if the scales tip in the employee's favor, the employee
"must prove that the use of the protected speech was a substantial or a
motivating factor" in the employer's decision." Fourth, if the employee
shows that the speech was a substantial or motivating factor, the burden
shifts to the employer to show that the same decision would be reached
in absence of the use of the protected speech.'" Steps three and four are
fact questions that need not be considered unless the court first finds, as a
matter of law, that the speech touches matters of public concern and that
the Pickering test favors protecting the speech."9
Following the U.S. Supreme Court's framework, the Gardetto court
defined matters of public concern as "political, social or other concern[s]
of the community."' ' Matters of mere personal interest such as internal
personnel disputes and working conditions do not address public con-
cerns.'" The court found four of Gardetto's six statements to be matters
of public concern.' 2 Gardetto's criticism of the college's reduction-in-
force procedures was a matter of public concern because it involved
public expenditures.' Like Pickering, Gardetto's opinion was informed
and valuable to public debate on the issue.'' Gardetto's support of non-
incumbent candidates for board positions was of public concern because
the board sets educational policy, and does not deal merely with matters
of internal college functioning.' Gardetto's criticism of Mason's misrep-
resenting himself as a doctor is a matter of public concern because the
142. Id.
144. Id. at 810-1I.






150. Id. at 812.
151. Id.
152. Id. at 815.
153. Id. at 814.
154. Id. (citing Pickering v. Board of Educ., 391 U.S. 563,572 (1968)).
155. Gardetto, 100 F.3d at 812.
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integrity and qualifications of a college president impact the social and
political fabric of the community.'" Gardetto's no confidence vote in
Mason held similar public concerns."' However, Gardetto's criticism of
the termination of a fellow employee was not a matter of public concern
because it was a mere matter of internal departmental affairs, and not the
subject of public debate.""
Once the court established that several of Gardetto's statements
were matters of public concern, it employed the balancing test. 59 Picker-
ing factors include the time, place, manner, and context of the state-
ments, whether the statements impair the discipline and close working
relationships within the agency, and whether the speech has a detrimental
impact on the speaker's loyalty and performance." Since the school
failed to produce evidence that Gardetto's speech disrupted the college's
services, the court ruled that the speech interests outweighed the school's
interests.'6 ' The court remanded the case for a jury determination of the
third and fourth steps.'62
2. Bunger v. University of Oklahoma Board of Regents 3
a. Facts
Bunger and Pradhan, two untenured professors at Cameron Univer-
sity School of Business,'" criticized election procedures for seats on the
university's policy-making council.'" Bunger campaigned for a seat on
the council.'" Despite receiving two-thirds of the votes, he was ineligible
to be elected to the council because he was untenured, and only tenured
professors were eligible for council positions.'67 The two professors com-
plained that the election procedures violated the faculty handbook." The
professors demanded that untenured faculty be eligible for council posi-
tions and that the school honor Bunger's election.' 9 They were both ter-
156. Id. at 812-13.
157. Id. at 813.
158. Id. at 814.
159. Id. at 815.
160. Id.
161. Id. at 816.
162. Id. at 817-18.
163. 95 F.3d 987 (10th Cir. 1996).
164. Cameron University School of Business is part of the University of Oklahoma system.
165. Bunger, 95 F.3d at 989.
166. Id.
167. Id. at 989-90.
168. Id. at 989.
169. Id. at 989-990.
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minated at the end of the academic year.'" The district court dismissed all
claims against the school.'"
b. Decision
The Tenth Circuit found that the professors' statements regarding
the procedures for election to the Graduate Council were not matters of
public concern.' 2 Whether a university council position is limited to ten-
ured faculty is a matter of internal structure within the university, and not
the subject of public debate.' The internal structure of the college is not
a political, social, or policy concern."" The court reiterated the policy set
forth in Connick that "what constitutes a matter of public concern must
be constrained by 'the common-sense realization that government offices
could not function if every employment decision became a constitutional
matter.""" Since the grievances Bunger and Pradhan brought were inter-
nal and personal in scope, they did not constitute matters of public con-
cern. 176
C. Other Circuits
The Seventh Circuit articulated the frustration the public concern
test poses. "As an inferior tribunal, our part is to apply the Supreme
Court's approach, fuzzy though it may be."'" Circuit courts struggle to
apply the Connick public concern test, especially when the speech could
easily be both public and private in nature. Not suprisingly, .the various
circuits produce inconsistent results.
The Tenth Circuit evaluated each of Gardetto's statements sepa-
rately, requiring the district court to identify those statements which con-
stituted a matter of public concern before the jury conducts its analysis.'
The Seventh Circuit, took the opposite approach in Khuans v. School
District 110.'"9 In Khuans, a teacher complained on numerous occasions
to school district officials about her supervisor's management skills.'" In
addition, she complained that the supervisor's failure to provide parents
with notification of educational planning meetings adversely affected the
special needs students at the school.'8 ' The court determined that state-
ments concerning the supervisor's impact on special services constituted
170. Id. at 990.
171. Id.
172. Id. at 992.
173. Id.
174. Id.
175. Id. (quoting Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138, 143 (1983)).
176. Id.
177. Wales v. Board of Educ., 120 F.3d 82, 85 (7th Cir. 1997).
178. Gardetto v. Mason, 100 F.3d 803, 817 (10th Cir. 1997).
179. 123 F.3d 1010 (7th Cir. 1997).
180. Khuans, 123 F.3d at 1016.
181. Id.
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matters of public concern, but general complaints about the supervisor
did not."2 Differing from the Tenth Circuit's approach, the court insisted
that where multiple statements formed the basis of the claim, the speech
must be viewed in its entirety.u3 Viewing all the remarks as a single
statement, the court found the speech "much closer to the 'private' than
the 'public' end of the spectrum. ' " Thus, the speech did not implicate
constitutional protections."
In Wales v. Board of Education," a public school teacher was ter-
minated for statements she made to her principal.'8' While on medical
leave due to the stress associated with classroom disruption and lack of
discipline, Wales wrote a memorandum to the principal complaining
about the school's disciplinary policies and procedures.'88 The court noted
that the complaints could be a purely private matter because they dealt
with employment conditions or, conversely, a public matter because the
complaints surrounded school management.'89 The court interpreted the
speech as a private matter concerning her employment conditions be-
cause Wales addressed the memo to the principal, suggesting that her
intent was to benefit only her personal, private interests." Thus, the Sev-
enth Circuit looked to circumstantial evidence of the motive behind the
speech to determine its content.
On the other hand, the Eighth Circuit found that motive behind the
speech did not make it unprotected.'9 ' The plaintiff, a social worker,
complained about the school's policy regarding the reporting of child
abuse.' The school district alleged that the plaintiff's motive for the
complaint was "to deflect blame for delaying a child abuse report," not
for the purpose of public policy concerns.'9" The court noted that the
speech was protected even when made privately to an employer'" be-
cause complaints about child abuse reporting policies were matters of
public concern.'9"
182. Id. at 1016-17.
183. Id.
184. Id. at 1017.
185. Id. at 1018.
186. 120 F.3d 82 (7th Cir. 1997).
187. Wales, 120 F.3d at 83.
188. Id.
189. Id. at 84-85.
190. Id. at 84. "Although the First Amendment is not limited to speech that is broadcast to the
world... an employee's decision to deliver the message in private supports an inference that the real
concern is the employment relation ... " Id.
191. Calvit v. Minneapolis Pub. Sch., 122 F.3d 1112, 1117(8th Cir. 1997).
192. Calvit, 122 F.3d at 1114.






The Tenth Circuit adopted a content-based approach in determining
whether speech is a matter of public concern. '9 The court attempted to
distinguish political, social, or other concerns of the community" from
matters of personal interest, internal personnel disputes, and working
condition issues.' This approach is content-based because it requires the
court to evaluate the content of the speech and to assess the level of pub-
lic interest. However, the content-based approach is highly speculative
and arbitrary. The court, in Bunger, seems to assume that procedures
governing election to the policy-making board of the college did not
raise issues of public debate. Yet, the policies the board promulgates
would likely be matters of public concern because the policies them-
selves affect the educational mission and effectiveness of the school.
Thus, the court tried to distinguish the policy-making board's procedures
for election from the policies themselves. While the content of the com-
plaints may in fact be different, it appears arbitrary to assert that one is a
matter of public concern while the other is not. Both are policies of the
university. While the court could conceivably distinguish between them,
doing so seems difficult and subjective. The Tenth Circuit should have
fashioned some more principled test to determine whether a statement is
a matter of public concern.
Of course, free speech has never meant "unregulated
talkativeness.Y Nonetheless, free speech is one of this nation's most
cherished rights upon which courts should be reluctant to encroach.
Thus, application of the Pickering test should conform to the policies
behind the First Amendment. Free speech doctrine contemplates at least
two related policies." First, it facilitates "the discovery and spread of
political truth.'' "° Second, it provides a medium for self-expression.2 The
public concern threshold ignores the need for self-expression and focuses
exclusively on the public's need for information.' While the Tenth Cir-
cuit is constrained by the U.S. Supreme Court's directive of using a pub-
lic concern threshold, it should apply Connick liberally in ascertaining
whether speech is a matter of public concern. Public concern is an elu-
sive benchmark. What is of no concern to one member of the public may
196. Bunger v. University of Okla. Bd. of Regents, 95 F.3d 989, 991 (10th Cir. 1996).
"Whether speech is of public concern depends on the 'content, form, and context of a given
statement as revealed by the whole record."' Id. (quoting Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138, 147-48
(1983)).
197. Gardetto v. Mason, 100 F.3d 803, 812 (1Oth Cir. 1996).
198. Id.
199. Pengtian Ma, Public Employee Speech and Public Concern: A Critique of the U.S.





203. Id. at 130.
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be significant to another. If the Tenth Circuit permitted more. speech to
be evaluated under the Pickering test, its decisions would be more con-
sistent with the polices of self-expression and dissemination of informa-
tion which underlie the First Amendment and the intent of the Framers.
III. SUPPLEMENTAL SECURITY PAYMENTS TO DISABLED CHILDREN
A. Background
Supplemental Security Income (SSI) provides benefits to disabled
children in order to help poor families pay for modifications and thera-
pies necessary for their child's disability.' These therapies in turn help
disabled children succeed in school and may be provided in conjunction
with other school services. An administrative law judge (ALJ) deter-
mines SSI eligibility pursuant to 20 C.F.R. § 416.924.' Traditionally,
"any medically determinable physical or mental impairment.., of com-
parable severity" to an impairment that would disable an adult consti-
tuted a disability.' A child engaged in gainful activity was not
disabled.' A child not engaged in gainful activity was deemed disabled
if the child's severe impairment was equivalent to an impairment identi-
fied in regulatory listings.' If the child's disability did not appear in the
listings, an individualized functional assessment (IFA) identified the
actual circumstances facing the child and assessed whether the impair-
ment was of comparable severity to that which would disable an adult.'
The ALJ considered the effect of the child's impairment on six areas of
development.2 ° The ALJ could find "comparable severity" if the child
showed marked impairment in one domain and moderate impairment in
another. "'
In 1996, Congress passed the Personal Responsibility and Work
Opportunity Reconciliation Act,22 raising the SSI eligibility standard
because costs were skyrocketing. Congress had received reports that
204. Congress Picks Myth Over Reality About Kids: America's Disabled are Denied Benefits in
a Misguided Effort to Fix a System That Wasn't Broken, ATLANTA J. & CONST., Nov. 9, 1997, at
D6.
205. See Quinones v. Chater, 117 F.3d 29, 32 (2d Cir. 1997).
206. 42 U.S.C. § 1382c(a)(3)(A) (1994) (defining adults as disabled if they are unable "to
engage in any substantial gainful activity" by reason of their impairment).
207. Age as a Factor of Evaluation in Childhood Disability, 20 C.F.R. § 416.924(a) (1998).
208. Id. For a list of impairments see 20 C.F.R. § 404(subpt. p, app.l) (1998).
209. Quinones, 117 F.3d at 34; see Todd A. Smith, Access to Justice for Kids-The Children's
SSI Project, 85 ILL. B.J. 352, 352 (1997) (discussing subsequent elimination of the "individual
functional assessment").
210. Quinones, 117 F.3d at 34. The six domains are: cognition, communication, motor abilities,
social abilities, personal behavioral patterns, and concentration, persistence, and pace in task
completion. Id.
211. Id.
212. Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act of 1996, Pub. L. No.
104-193, 110 Stat. 2105 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 42 U.S.C.).
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families were abusing the program,"' and the SSI price tag had tripled in
the previous six years."'
This new legislation redefined disability, effectively slashing SSI
eligibility for thousands of children and pulled the rug out from under
families who depend on SSI benefits."' The Act provides: "An individual
under the age of eighteen shall be considered disabled.., if that individ-
ual has a medically determinable physical or mental impairment, which
results in marked and severe functional limitations."" 6 The new standard
eliminates the IFA requirement to determine if the impairment is of
"comparable severity to that which would disable an adult."2 7 The new
standard also requires that if the impairments do not meet or equal a
listed impairment, the handicap is not marked and severe, and the child is
not disabled.' The ALJ may rely on considered testimony from the par-
ent regarding the severity of the symptoms of the impairment, but medi-
cal evidence must support specific findings of impairment."9 Thus, under
the heightened scrutiny mandated by the new standards, a child is now
less likely to receive SSI benefits.
B. Brown v. Callahan'
1. Facts
Gertrude Brown appealed an order denying SSI benefits for her
daughter, Khilamey Wallace, who had asthma and a speech
impairment." The ALJ denied benefits, determining that her impair-
ments were not severe enough to be comparable to that which would
disable an adult.' Subsequently, Congress enacted legislation affecting
SSI benefits,' which stated that the new standards apply to all cases not
213. Barbara Vobejda & Amy Goldstein, Quick Review Promised for SSI Rules; Thousands of
Children Have Lost Benefits, WASHINGTON POST, Nov. 9, 1997, at A9. Congressional outrage was
inflamed by stories such as an Arkansas family who collected $61,000 a year for their eleven
children simply for the children "acting crazy." See Congress Picks Myth Over Reality About Kids:
America's Disabled Are Denied Benefits in a Misguided Effort to Fix a System That Wasn't Broken,
supra note 204.
214. Vobejda & Goldstein, supra note 213.
215. Id.
216. 42 U.S.C.A. § 1382c(a)(3)(C)(i) (West 1992 & Supp. 1997) (emphasis added).
217. Brown v. Callahan, 120 F.3d 1133, 1135 (10th Cir. 1997).
218. Brown, 120 F.3d at 1135.
219. Id. at 1135-36.
220. 120F.3d 1133 (10th Cir. 1997).
221. Brown, 120 F.3d at 1134.
222. Id. at 1135.
223. Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act of 1996, Pub. L. No.
104-193, 110 Stat. 2105 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 42 U.S.C.).
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finally adjudicated including those on appeal since August 1996."' Thus,
the new standards applied to Brown's appeal. '
2. Decision
The Tenth Circuit affirmed, finding that substantial evidence sup-
ported the AL's determination that Wallace's impairment was not dis-
abling. 226 The AU found no medical evidence to establish mental or
nervous problems or that Wallace's speech impediment or her asthma
were disabling.' 7 In fact, medical records characterized the asthma as
mild." Since the evidence did not establish a mental or nervous impair-
ment meeting or equaling a listed impairment, Wallace's impairment was
not marked and severe.22 Therefore, she was not disabled and not eligible
to receive SSI benefits/' °
C. Other Circuits
Decisions in other circuits mirror the Tenth Circuit's interpretation
of the new statute. The Sixth Circuit, for example, noted "this legislation
removes the use of the 'individualized functional assessment' test."' The
Second Circuit also acknowledged the new definition of childhood dis-
ability, but only applied the new definition to appeals filed after the ef-
fective date of the act. " Since the new standards are stricter than the old
standards, the Ninth Circuit found that any case denying benefits under
the prior standard should also be denied under the new standard. 3
D. Analysis
The new standards for defining disability and SSI eligibility make
disabled children and their families one of the premier casualties of the
nation's assault on welfare. The "marked and severe" threshold and the
elimination of the IFA clearly make children's collection of SSI benefits
more difficult. The IFA's broad scope increased a child's eligibility
chances because it considered the actual circumstances of the child,
rather than whether the circumstances fit an identified disability.'
224. Brown, 120 F.3d at 1135 (citing section 211 (d)(1) of the Act found in the notes following
42 U.S.C.A. § 1382(c) (West 1992 & Supp. 1997)).
225. Id.





231. Vibbert v. Secretary of Health and Human Serv., 121 F.3d 710, 710 (6th Cir. 1997).
232. Quinones v. Chater, 117 F.3d 29, 33 n.4 (2d Cir. 1997).
233. Jamerson v. Chater, 112 F.3d 1064 (9th Cir. 1997).
234. See Smith, supra note 209, at 352.
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As a consequence of the heightened standards, Congress drastically
reduced the number of children eligible for benefits."5 Moreover, the
Social Security Administration must re-determine the eligibility of chil-
dren who currently receive benefits under the previous standard. 6 In
effect, children currently receiving benefits may be told that they are "no
longer disabled." As a result, approximately 135,000 children stand to
lose their benefits; 7 approximately 112,000 of them have a mental dis-
order."8
The reforms are problematic because economic motives underlie
them, rather than principled reasons substantively tied to the child's dis-
ability. The suggestion that the child is less disabled in 1996 than she
was in 1995 because Congress changed the rules strains logic. To cut off
funds to the needy merely to save money or prevent abuse is short-
sighted. Perhaps, most significantly, since the new law makes eligibility
much more difficult to obtain, families may feel compelled to retain
counsel at administrative hearings, 9 either at their own expense or
through pro bono services.2" In addition, families unable to obtain neces-
sary therapies will turn to schools to try to compensate for those lost
therapies.
IV. SCHOOL DESEGREGATION
Perhaps the most politically charged Tenth Circuit case decided
during the past year was Keyes v. School District No. 1"24 The case origi-
nated in 1969, and has evolved through several stages of litigation over
the past twenty-eight years."2 The appeal challenged desegregation in
Denver Public Schools and the constitutionality of the Colorado Consti-
tution's busing clause,"3 Colorado's Public Schools of Choice Act2" and
235. Legislation & Regulations, 20 MENTAL & PHYSICAL DISABILITY L. REP. 761, 761 (1996).
236. Id.
237. Robert A. Rosenblatt & Melissa Healy, Welfare Law Will Exclude 135,000 Disabled
Children, L.A. TIMES, Feb. 7, 1997, at A24.
238. Jocelyn Y. Stewart, Kids Lose Disability Payments: New Rules Anger Parents, Advocates,
ARIZ. REPUBLIC, Oct. 18, 1997, at A12. Mental disorders which were previously, but no longer,
eligible include personality disorders, maladaptive behavior, learning disabilities, and attention
deficit disorder. Id.
239. Smith, supra note 209, at 352.
240. See id. (describing the Children's SSI Project as a coalition of legal services, pro bono, and
law school programs to help represent children in administrative SSI hearings).
241. 119F.3d 1437 (10thCir. 1997).
242. Keyes, 119 F.3d at 1440. The original case, Keyes v. School District No. 1, 303 F. Supp.
279 (D. Colo. 1969), is referred to elsewhere in this survey as "Keyes I".
243. Keyes, 119 F.3d at 1440. The "busing clause" provides that no student shall "be assigned
or transported to any public educational institution for the purpose of achieving racial balance."
COLO. CONST., art. IX, § 8 (amended 1974).
244. COLO. REV. STAT. § 22-36-101 (1997) states, in relevant part:
[E]very school district ... shall allow [its pupils] ... to enroll in particular programs or
schools within such school district....
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Colorado's Charter Schools Act.' The Tenth Circuit dismissed the case
because the court determined that it lacked jurisdiction, ' the issues were
not justiciably ripe, and the plaintiffs lacked standing.'
A. Background
In 1954, the U.S. Supreme Court ruled that segregation in public
schools is unconstitutional.2' One year later, in Brown I,29 federal dis-
trict courts were granted jurisdiction to fashion remedial decrees to de-
segregate public schools.' School districts had "primary responsibility
for . . . assessing and solving segregation problems. ' District courts
appraised school district efforts and ensured that the school districts
made a "prompt and reasonable start toward full compliance. ' ' "s The U.S.
Supreme Court, in Green v. School Board of New Kent County,"3 recited
a mandate from Brown II requiring that school boards take affirmative
steps to transform a "dual segregated system" into a "unitary system. '
The Green Court identified five aspects of school operations, including
student assignments, faculty and staff assignments, transportation, facili-
... Any school district may deny any of its resident pupils or any nonresident pupils
from other school districts within the state permission to enroll in particular programs or
schools within such school district only for any of the following reasons:
(a) ... lack of space or teaching staff....
(b) The school requested does not offer appropriate programs ....
(c) The pupil does not meet the established eligibility criteria for participation in a
particular program ....
(d) A desegregation plan is in effect for the school district, and such denial is
necessary in order to enable compliance with such desegregation plan.
(e) The student has been expelled ....
245. COLO. REV. STAT. § 22-30.5-104 (1997). The statute also states:
A charter school shall be a public non-sectarian, non-religious.., school which
operates within a public school district.
(3) A charter school shall be subject.., to any court ordered desegregation plan in
effect for the school district .... Enrollment decisions shall be made in a
nondiscriminatory manner ....
(6) Pursuant to contract, a charter school may operate free from specified school
district policies and state regulations.
Id.
246. Keyes, 119F.3dat 1440.
247. Id. at 1443-46.
248. Brown v. Board of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
249. Brown v. Board of Educ. (Brown II), 349 U.S. 294 (1955). Brown i mandated the
elimination of racial discrimination in public schools and assigned roles to both school districts and
federal district courts to implement the desegregation process. See Haeryung Shin, Note, Safety In
Numbers? Equal Protection, Desegregation, and Discrimination: School Desegregation in a Multi-
Cultural Society, 82 CORNELL L. REV. 182, 191-92 (1996).
250. John E. Lee, The Rise (And Fall?) of Race-Conscious Remedies and "Benign" Racial
Discrimination Public Education, 30 SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 153, 160 (1996).
251. Shin, supra note 249, at 191-92.
252. Id. at 191 (quoting Brown, 349 U.S. at 300).
253. 391 U.S. 430 (1968).
254. Green, 391 U.S at 437-38 (holding that the school district's freedom of choice plan was
insufficient to create a unitary system).
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ties, and extra-curricular activities, as the most important indicia of seg-
regation. '
In response, many school districts instituted remedial measures
based on benign racial classifications, including racial quotas, redistrict-
ing, and busing students away from neighborhood schools which were
predominantly composed of one race.' In Swann v. Charlotte-
Mecklenburg Board of Education, the Court upheld busing as a race
conscious remedial measure to desegregate schools. 8 Two years later, in
Keyes v. School District. No. 1 (Keyes If 9 the Swann ruling extended to
northern and western states, holding that school districts without recent
history of de jure segregation were nonetheless obligated to desegregate
if any discriminatory history tarnished the district.2"
In 1971, the U.S. Supreme Court ruled that school districts were not
required to implement cross-district remedial plans absent an actual in-
ter-district violation.' In addition, the Education Amendments of 1972,
known as the "Antibusing Amendments," prohibited construction of
education laws to require busing." During the 1980s, school districts
began their return to neighborhood schools.2" Recently, federal courts
have permitted school districts to abandon benign remedial plans if the
districts achieved "unitary status.' 'M In Board of Education v. Dowell,"
the U.S. Supreme Court held that desegregation injunctions were "not
intended to operate in perpetuity,"' and "the school district is under no
duty to remedy imbalance that is caused by demographic factors."67 The
court further noted that racial balance was necessary only as a response
to a constitutional violation by the school district."' In the 1990s, the
U.S. Supreme Court began to assess whether school districts achieved
unitary status.' A school district achieved unitary status "if it had en-
gaged in good faith compliance with earlier desegregation decrees and
255. Id. at 438.
256. Lee, supra note 250, at 165-67.
257. 402 U.S. 1 (1971).
258. Swann, 402 U.S at 29-31.
259. 413 U.S. 189 (1973).
260. Keyes, 413 U.S. at 210-13.
261. Milliken v. Bradley, 418 U.S. 717, 744-45 (1974).
262. Education Amendments of 1972, 20 U.S.C. §§ 1651-56 (1994). "No provision of this Act
shall be construed to require the assignment or transportation of students or teachers in order to
overcome racial imbalance." Id. § 165 1.
263. See Davison M. Douglas, The End Of Busing?, 95 MICH. L. REV. 1715, 1723 (1997).
264. Id. at 1722.
265. 489 U.S. 237 (1991).
266. Dowell, 498 U.S. at 248; see Shin, supra note 249, at 193, 195 (discussing the Supreme
Court's changing focus with respect to desegregation decrees).
267. Freeman v. Pitts, 503 U.S. 407,494 (1992).
268. Id.
269. Id. at 486-87; Dowell, 498 U.S. at 245; see Douglas, supra note 263, at 1723 (concluding
that historically segregated neighborhoods pose significant difficulties for courts attempting to
determine if public schools are guilty of historical discrimination).
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had eliminated the vestiges of past discrimination." ° In addition, in the
1990s, the Court has consistently applied "strict scrutiny" to government
racial classifications.27'
School districts responded to judicial deference granted to them by
abandoning racially classified remedial programs in favor of charter
schools, magnet schools, and public schools of choice." Critics charge
that schools are returning to segregation as districts, such as Denver
Public Schools, seek to avoid federal court supervision, and as benign
race-based remedial measures are dismantled in favor of magnet and
charter schools." Charter schools are "legislatively authorized publicly
funded school[s] of limited enrollment" that exist outside the scope of
the existing school district structure." ' In exchange for public funding,
the trustees of the school contractually bind themselves to accountability
for student performance."5 The charter schools movement started in Min-
nesota in 1991, and has gained momentum in the education reform
movement in the 1990s. 6 President Clinton recently called for more
charter schools nationwide, and the 1996 Republican Party platform also
endorsed charter schools.'
B. Keyes v. School District No. 1 (Keyes XIX)"7'
1. Facts
In 1969, the U.S. district court in Denver ordered a citywide deseg-
regation plan after finding that from 1960-1969 the Denver School Dis-
270. Douglas, supra note 263, at 1723 (citing Dowell, 498 U.S. at 249-50). A vestige of
segregation is "a policy or practice which is traceable to the prior de jure system of segregation and
which continues to have discriminatory effects." See United States v. City of Yonkers, 833 F. Supp.
214, 218-19 (S.D.N.Y. 1993).
271. See Miller v. Johnson, 515 U.S. 900, 904 (1995) (applying strict scrutiny to redistricting
plan designed to increase minority representation); Adarand Const., Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200, 236-
37 (1995) (subjecting federal race-based classifications to strict scrutiny); Lee, supra note 250, at
176-77.
272. See Douglas, supra note 263, at 1716. Magnet schools seek to achieve the effects of
integration by attracting white students to urban schools, which offer a specialty area of study not
available in the suburban school. Thus, the white students are voluntarily attracted to the urban
school. Similarly, charter schools and public schools of choice seek to attract voluntary integration
by emphasizing parental choice. Id.
273. Id. at 1715. Douglas argues that segregation levels have increased such that urban schools
are now more racially imbalanced than they were prior to 1971. Id. He noted that more than 80% of
the nation's minority students live in metropolitan areas, and in the nation's largest cities, 15 out of
every 16 Black and Latino students attend schools where most of the students are non-white. Id. at
1721-22.
274. Karla A Turekian, Traversing the Minefields of Education Reform: The Legality of
Charter Schools, 29 CONN. L. REV. 1365, 1373 (1997).
275. Id. at 1374.
276. Id. at 1372.
277. Id. at 1373.
278. 119 F.3d 1437 (10th Cir. 1997) [hereinafter Keyes XIX].
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trict had established and maintained de jure segregation in the public
schools.' While under district court supervision, Denver Public Schools
(DPS) underwent significant change and took steps, including busing, to
remedy past discrimination. "80 The desegregation plan was revised in
1976 to include transporting students by bus."' As a consequence of
busing, the district lost more than 30,000 pupils to "white flight" into the
suburban school districts as families avoided forced busing of their chil-
dren."
In Keyes XIX,' the district court terminated its jurisdiction and su-
pervision over the DPS desegregation efforts because past de jure segre-
gation had been eliminated and DPS had achieved unitary status.' In
that case, Keyes asked for a determination of the constitutionality of the
Colorado Constitution's busing clause as well as the charter schools and
schools of choice statutes.' The district court did not rule on the consti-
tutionality of the busing clause or on the two statutory provisions be-
cause that determination would constitute an advisory opinion." On ap-
peal, Keyes asked for a determination of the constitutionality of all three
laws, but did not challenge the termination of the district court's juris-
diction over desegregation efforts. 7 Keyes argued that the busing clause,
established in 1974, which prohibits the busing of students, blocks any
effective school integration program, thus precluding the district from
continuing desegregation efforts and violating the Equal Protection
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment by subverting benefits based on
race.28
2. Decision
The Tenth Circuit first determined that Keyes's request to determine
the constitutionality of the busing clause, the Public Schools of Choice
Act, and the Charter Schools Act lacked .ripeness." The parties stipulated
there was conflict between the busing clause and the district's policies
which would justify a ruling on the constitutionality of the clause, but
they could not show actual conflict between the clause and any specific
policy.' However, "parties cannot create a case or controversy .. . by
agreement."'" Keyes argued that the constitutional and statutory provi-
279. Keyes XIX, 119 F.3d at 1440.
280. Busing's Diehards Try Again, ROCKY MOUNTAIN NEWS, Sept. 26, 1996, at 52A.
281. KeyesXIX, 119 F.3d at 1441.
282. Id.
283. Keyes v. Congress of Hispanic Educators, 902 F. Supp. 1274 (D. Colo. 1995).
284. Keyes XIX, 119 F.3d at 1440.
285. Id. at 1442.
286. Id.
287. Id.
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sions prevented the district and individual schools from instituting any
potential voluntary integration plan because the plan would conflict with
the busing clause.' However, absent any specific district or individual
school site attempt to implement a voluntary desegregation plan barred
by the busing clause, the problem was hypothetical."
Next, the court ruled that Keyes did not have standing to bring the
suit. ' To have standing, plaintiffs must demonstrate injury in fact."5 The
plaintiffs lacked standing for the same reasons that the issue lacked ripe-
ness. They could not demonstrate that the school district or any school
had withdrawn policies or refrained from instituting desegregation poli-
cies as a result of the busing clause.m
C. Other Circuits
School districts nationwide continue to struggle with eliminating the
vestiges of past segregation. The Eighth Circuit, in Jenkins v. State of
Missouri,' affirmed the district court's order denying a declaration of
unitary status.' The court reiterated the good faith compliance and
elimination of vestiges of past discrimination standards for determining
whether a school district has become unitary.' In addition, unless the
school district has previously achieved unitary status, it bears the burden
of proof.' Once the court finds an unlawful dual school system in the
past, the court presumes current disparities are the result of unconstitu-
tional conduct.0' Using the Green factors,3" the court found that the dis-
trict carried its burden to prove unitary status only in the extra-curricular
activities category." Specifically, the district could not prove that wide
gaps in student achievement between white and black students was due
to socio-economic or demographic factors.tm Thus, the district had not
ameliorated racial isolation attributable to de jure segregation in the
past."
The Second Circuit, in United States v. City of Yonkers,3" held the
state of New York liable for violation of the Equal Protection Clause of
292. Id. at 1444-45.
293. Id.
294. Id. at 1445.
295. Id.
296. Id.
297. 122 F.3d 588 (8th Cir. 1997).
298. Jenkins, 122 F.3d at 591.
299. Id. at 595-96.
300. Id. at 593.
301. Id.
302. See id. at 592 n.3.
303. Id. at 592.
304. Id. at 598-99.
305. Id. at 591.
306. 96 F.3d 600 (2d Cir. 1996).
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the Fourteenth Amendment for failure to take steps to remedy segrega-
tion." After several unsuccessful school district attempts, the district
court denied unitary status for the district in 1993, noting that minority
students received different education" from majority students and that
compliance with existing remedial orders would be inadequate to elimi-
nate the vestiges of segregation.3 "9 The state undoubtedly knew of the de
jure segregation in Yonkers School District, but did not take steps to end
it.' Moreover, the district court found "determined reluctance" by the
state to enforce its own desegregation policy because "race-based politi-
cal opposition to integration" pressured the state to ignore signs of segre-
gation in the district."' The Second Circuit found that foreseeability of
the segregative effect of the state's inaction and its departure from its
normal procedural and substantive sequences, sufficiently established
discriminatory intent required by the U.S. Supreme Court in equal pro-
tection racial disparate impact claims."
D. Analysis
Although the court dismissed Keyes, the case draws the battle lines
over desegregation in the future. Judge Murphy's opinion appears to
invite school districts or individual schools to implement their own spe-
cific desegregation plans that may be in conflict with the busing clause.
The basis of the denial of jurisdiction is the fact that no policies have
been put into place or that schools have refrained from putting them into
place. Thus, the case can become justiciable once districts begin to im-
plement policies in conflict with the busing clause. Schools themselves
must establish their own programs to maintain integration. When these
programs are challenged, the constitutionality of the busing clause, the
Charter Schools Act, and the Public School of Choice Act should be-
come justiciable because the cases are tied to specific desegregation pro-
grams.
However, it appears unlikely that schools will develop programs
that challenge the busing clause. The Denver public school system has
been fighting against judicial supervision for over twenty years, seeking
307. Yonkers, 96 F.3d at 617-18.
308. Id. at 603-04.
309. Id. at 604.
310. Id. at 607. "[The State] lost the will to act for the simple reason that its once touted
principles of racial equality in the schools had become politically untenable." Id. (quoting United
States v. City of Yonkers, 880 F. Supp. 212, 227 (S.D.N.Y. 1995)).
311. Yonkers, 96 F.3d at 612. A plaintiff is required to show not only that the state action
produced disproportionate or discriminatory impact, but also that the state acted with intent to
discriminate. See Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Hous. Dev. Corp., 429 U.S. 252, 267 (1977)
(setting forth a list of factors which aid in determining discriminatory intent); Washington v. Davis,
426 U.S. 229, 239 (1976) (concluding that a law is not unconstitutional "solely because it has a
racially disproportionate impact").
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freedom from mandatory busing."2 Moreover, busing students is politi-
cally unpopular and too controversial for school districts to risk imple-
menting." ' Thus, the court's apparent invitation to create a justiciable
issue may be unrealistic. According to the attorney for Keyes, the busing
clause "puts a dagger in the heart" of any future school desegregation
plans."" Because the Tenth Circuit ruling requires an actual desegregation
plan that the district is unlikely to implement, he may be right. However,
the Yonkers decision could encourage districts and state governments to
pursue voluntary desegregation plans in order to avoid equal protection
disparate impact liability. Because the Second Circuit inferred discrimi-
natory intent from the state's failure to take steps to remedy known seg-
regation in Yonkers,3 ' school districts and state governments are placed
in a tenuous policy position, feeling the pinch from political pressure on
the one side and from constitutional imperatives on the other.
CONCLUSION
Tenth Circuit decisions during this survey period appear to afford
greater deference to school district discretion in managing educational
affairs. The Keyes decision is a very clear sign of judicial deference to
school districts and indicates reluctance to intervene on desegregation
grounds. Although the Fowler decision seems to constrain district dis-
cretion in determining appropriate special education services, congres-
sional clarification of the IDEA emphasized district discretion, and
caused the Tenth Circuit to retreat from its early Fowler ruling. The pub-
lic concern threshold for public employee speech continues to constrain
free speech by public employees and to protect the discretion of public
agencies, including schools, to terminate employees for speech regarding
the internal operations of the school. The new SSI eligibility standards,
however, will have a powerful and detrimental residual impact on
schools. As more and more families watch their SSI benefits dry up, and
are consequently unable to pay for therapy, services, and treatment for
their disabled children, they will become increasingly dependent upon
schools to provide these essential and badly needed services.
Bryan M. Schwartz
312. See Keyes XIX, 119 F.3d at 1440-41 (10th Cir. 1997) (recounting history of conflict
between the Denver schools and the federal courts).
313. See Alan Gottlieb, Busing Changed Lives: Subject Still Deeply Divides Sides, DENVER
POST, Aug. 27, 1996, at A I (noting the contentious and dividing effect of busing).
314. Alan Gottlieb, Anti-Busing Clause Challenged Constitutional Amendment: Colorado
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